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Abstract 
Almost 50 years ago Robert Dahl maintained “we can […] reasonably hope 1 day to achieve great democratic cities. 
As the optimum unit for democracy in the 21st century, the city has a greater claim, I think, than any other alterna-
tive” (Am Polit Sci Rev 61: 953–970, 1967). This article intends to ascertain whether the words of one of the greatest 
scholars of democracy have had a concrete outcome along the pathways taken by democratic theory and whether, 
therefore, as was the case in classical theory, real superiority has therefore been restored to the city compared with 
the other territorial institutions of democracy. In this article we begin with two assumptions, each concerning the 
theoretical status of democratic theory. The first maintains that a realistic and an idealistic dimension coexist in 
variable dimensions in theoretical democratic models. According to the second assumption, it can be stated that 
democratic theory envisages the presence of a local territorial dimension, the importance of which is nevertheless 
variable in the different theoretical models. The thesis we intend to demonstrate here is that the variable nature of the 
importance of the local-urban territorial dimension depends on the type of balance created between the idealistic 
and realistic dimensions of the different models of democracy. Concluding, we aim to theoretically demonstrate why 
(and at which conditions) the city can become, more and better than any other institutional place, the ultimate arena 
within which the best results may be achieved for democracy in 21st century.
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Background: two assumptions of democratic 
theory
First assumption: democratic theory includes a realistic 
and an idealistic dimension
In the theory and in contemporary political science the 
concept of democracy shows a dual nature. Giovanni 
Sartori (1987, 1993) is one of the most accurate authors 
in grasping this and most diligent in discussing its impli-
cations for research. He emphasises that the lemma 
“democracy” really became manifest in a theoretical and 
methodological universe of a descriptive kind: accord-
ing to this meaning, facts should limit themselves to cor-
roborating or invalidating the explanations of the various 
empirically observable aspects into which the concept of 
democracy branches; the purpose is to ascertain which 
conditions enable democracy to develop and which oth-
ers shape its different distinctive features.
This same notion is enriched, however, by intrinsic 
normative meanings when the aim to explain demo-
cratic phenomenology is flanked, often implicitly but not 
always, by that of steering choices, both of those govern-
ing and those being governed, of the regimes, processes 
and results of democracy: so that the facts selected can 
point out the routes to be followed in order to create, on 
a concrete plane, the best of the possible democratic out-
comes, given certain objectives to reach or problems to 
solve.
On this issue Sartori has the approval of some impor-
tant voices. This was one of the themes raised by 
Theodore Lowi (1971), when, speaking of American 
democracy, he said that there was no way of separating 
empirical political models from opinions on the nature 
and requisites of good political models. Even Dahl, 
though aware of the distance between what he called the 
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Ideal Democratic Republic and the concrete applications 
of democratic rules—the polyarchies—invites us not to 
give up trying to reach out to ideal models, whenever 
possible. “But we all know”, Dahl states (1982: 107), “that 
the institutions, processes, and conditions of polyarchy in 
democratic countries fall far short of meeting democratic 
criteria”.
This awareness, Dahl warns, does not, however, justify 
inaction: “They are simply considerations to be taken into 
account in clarifying the alternatives before us. Human 
problems have better and worse solutions […] even the 
better solutions will usually have disadvantages, some-
times grave ones. But to say that a solution has disadvan-
tages is never a good reason for preferring the worse to 
the better” (1982: 107).
Facts and values, when we speak of democratic regimes 
and procedures, thus show their strong inclination 
towards interaction. Already the assumption of a particu-
lar concept of democracy—let us say Dahl’s polyarchy as 
quoted—tends to direct the empirical analysis towards a 
certain universe of values, which corresponds to the ret-
roactive idea of “good model of democratic government”. 
To speak of polyarchy, then, following Dahl, as a system 
in which power over those holding political office is 
widely spread throughout society,1 means to establish an 
indissoluble line of contiguity between what democracy 
is and what we would like it to be.
The fact of actually admitting on an empirical plane 
that polyarchies do not necessarily implement the fun-
damental control we were speaking about (of the gov-
erned over the governors), and that, on the contrary, 
this should be checked case by case, implicitly means to 
adopt a clear, logical approach: that polyarchy, namely 
what democracy is, depends to some extent on how we 
(in this case, Dahl) imagine it should be. That is to say, on 
its ideal configuration.
Nor does the fact of taking as the subject of one’s analy-
sis a concept with a neutral or procedural tendency like, 
for example, the renowned one of Joseph Schumpeter 
(1942), exonerate the researcher from making an objec-
tive or aim his own, when he is preparing to bring that 
same notion to life, applying it to the study of concrete 
cases.2
Hence, if attention to purposes is indispensable to 
describe a system as democratic, the axiological refer-
ence proves inherent in every definition of democracy: “It 
ensues that the relation between ideal and real (and 
1 By means of a relatively high degree of control exercised by common citi-
zens over their leaders (Dahl 1963).
2 Political scientists have moreover hesitated to use the concept of democ-
racy without adding adjectives that to some extent described it further. 
As the analysis carried out shows, for example, by first-rate theorists like 
Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl (1993) and Leonardo Morlino (2003).
sometimes the tension) is immanent in any theory or 
model of democracy, whether of a normative-ideal or 
descriptive-realistic type” (Mura 1997: 403).3
On the basis of this assumption we define the realistic 
dimension of democratic theory as that which tends to 
satisfy at least one of the following requisites: (1) describe 
the features of models of democratic rule; (2) illustrate 
the conditions of birth and development of the demo-
cratic regime; (3) conceive of democracy as a system of 
government endowed with specific characteristics and 
subject to particular conditions of development, able to 
produce decisions that are binding for the communities 
to whom it is applied.
On the other hand, we define the idealistic dimension 
of democracy as that which tends to satisfy at least one 
of the following requisites: (1) single out the features of 
models of good democratic rule; (2) select the conditions 
of birth and development of a good democratic regime; 
(3) conceive of democracy as a system of good govern-
ment endowed with specific characteristics and subject 
to particular conditions of development, able to produce 
decisions that are binding, to which positive opinions are 
attributed by the community to whom the system of gov-
ernment is applied.
Second assumption: the local‑urban territorial dimension 
is a factor of variable importance in democratic theory
Nowadays, for the first time in human history, most of the 
inhabitants of the planet lead an urban life (in metropoli-
tan areas, in small and medium-sized cities, in towns). 
This trend is set to continue: in 2050 it is estimated that 
it will be concentrated in the cities the 75 % of the global 
population, and that people will reside primarily in meg-
alopolis of several million inhabitants and in regions with 
an intense urbanization that will extend beyond the bor-
ders of the states and continents (Venice Biennale 2006). 
Quoting a classic work by Louis Wirth we assume here a 
“sociological definition of the city” (Wirth 1938: 3) that 
is considered as a “relatively large, dense, and perma-
nent settlement of heterogeneous individuals” (1938: 8). 
In this tripartition, the “large numbers” (1938: 10–14), 
account for “individual variability, the relative absence 
of intimate personal acquaintanceship, the segmentali-
zation of human relations which are largely anonymous, 
superficial, and transitory, and associated characteris-
tics”. “Density” (1938: 14–16), on the other hand, involves 
“diversification and specialization, the coincidence of 
close physical contact and distant social relations, glaring 
contrasts, a complex pattern of segregation, the predomi-
nance of formal social control, and accentuated friction, 
among other phenomena”. At last, “heterogeneity” (1938: 
3 Our translation.
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16–18), stands for the “break[ing] down [of ] rigid social 
structures and […] produc[ing] increased mobility, insta-
bility, and insecurity, and the affiliation of the individuals 
with a variety of intersecting and tangential social groups 
with a high rate of membership turnover”.
From the early 1990s onwards, to the numerous studies 
on the economic, sociological, organisational and demo-
graphic role of cities in the development of contemporary 
democracies, just as many papers were added on the polit-
ical and institutional importance exerted by cities and local 
governments in the functioning of democracies (Bagnasco 
and Le Galès 2000; Lascoumes and Le Galès 2004). The lat-
ter research theme is crucial for us and political science has 
produced literature on it that is as vast in its consistency 
as it is fragmented in its theoretical interpretations. The 
outcome of this research question would have been quite 
different if it had been asked a couple of thousand years 
ago, to the hypothetical experts of political matters of the 
Greek and Roman world. They would probably not have 
hesitated to reply, with a certain uniformity of opinion, 
that the city is the functional prerequisite of any form of 
government. Quoting Aristotle’s first book of Politics, they 
would have reached the point of maintaining that outside 
the city there is no space for a truly human life, since the 
city alone enables the flourishing of the associative virtues 
that characterise the development of community life. Con-
cerning the democratic form of government, in particular, 
the city indicates the indissoluble link between urban form 
of the social community and autonomy of political deci-
sion, which structurally characterised the Greek polis first, 
then the Roman res publica.
If the idea of classical democracy was urban-centred, 
the development of the concept in modern times has 
lost the requisite of urban centrality, to take on that of 
State centrality. In so doing, however, the primordial link 
between city and democratic government has been lost. 
Local government in general, and the city in particular, 
have become one of the many aspects characterising the 
division of power on a territorial scale, the importance of 
which tends to alter, upwards or downwards, becoming 
for some a dangerous diaphragm (a vehicle of particular-
ism and factionalism in the governor-governed relation-
ship), and for others a precious source of inclusivity and 
participatory capacities.
Methods: research questions, hypotheses 
and theses
In the light of the second assumption the following ques-
tions arise:
•  If this is so, what is the role of the city in the different 
models of democracy, and what determines the variabil-
ity of this role? If States are the rulers and controllers of 
democratic citizenship, are cities still tied to democratic 
development? In recent democratic theories can we find 
alternative models of democracy able to challenge the 
State-centred ones, as regards the importance of the city 
in democratic political structures and processes?
To answer the above questions in this paper we suggest 
that there is a cause–effect relationship between the first 
and second assumptions of democratic theory. Namely, 
we put forward the hypothesis that:
•  Given the one-to-one interaction between realistic and 
idealistic dimensions, the more or less salient role of 
the city in democratic theory depends, in basic terms, 
on the prevalence of one dimension over the other.
Under this hypothesis we support the following thesis:
•  The more accentuated the prevalence of the realistic 
dimension, the less important the local-urban territo-
rial dimension and the more the national-State one; 
vice versa, the more accentuated the prevalence of 
the idealistic dimension in the theoretical democratic 
model, the more important the local-urban dimension 
and the less the national-State one.
The logical link maintained here is made explicit by the 
arguments we will call: Hobbes’ argument and de Toc-
queville’s argument.
Hobbes’ argument: central control and decisional 
capacities of representative government institutions
As can be deduced from Chapter XXII of the Leviathan, 
Thomas Hobbes was not in principle against the presence 
of local institutions in political regimes. Provided, how-
ever, that they be explicitly subjected to the sovereignty 
of the politico-administrative centre. In the paragraph 
entitled: “A Bodie Politique For Counsel To Be Give To 
The Soveraign” on the subject of local institutions, he 
states that their existence is acceptable “onely for such 
matters as shall be propounded unto them by that Man, 
or Assembly, that by the Soveraign Authority sent for 
them; and when it shall be declared that nothing more 
shall be propounded, nor debated by them, the Body is 
dissolved. For if they were the absolute Representative of 
the people, then were it the Soveraign Assembly; and so 
there would be two Soveraign Assemblies, or two Sove-
raigns, over the same people; which cannot consist with 
their Peace” (Hobbes 1651: 169).
For Hobbes, then, the oneness of sovereignty, namely 
the control of legitimate violence on a territory by a 
single holder of power, is a prerequisite of social peace, 
which is the supreme good of the community.
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This is an argument that, with the necessary modi-
fications, may also be applied to democratic theory. 
For if we follow this line of argument, in realistic types 
of democratic models it is the actual functioning of the 
mechanisms and procedures enabling a certain degree of 
control of the decision-makers by citizens and a certain 
decisional capacity of those governing that counts.
The actual functioning of these mechanisms and proce-
dures is guaranteed by the spreading of civil and political 
rights on a plane of formal equality, and by the creation of 
representative forms of government. When these rights 
and forms of government are applied to a demos com-
posed of a large number of individuals, whose commu-
nity is based prevalently (though not solely) on cultural 
affinities of a national nature, the relationship between 
governors and governed must be based on representative 
systems of a national character; in order to produce col-
lectively binding decisions, these systems must espouse 
a certain degree of “Stateness” (Nettl 1968), defined “as 
the state’s capacity to impose law and order within its 
territory, to construct and implement policies, and to 
claim legitimacy as a political unit” (Andersen et al. 2014: 
1207–1208). The fragmentation of powers on a local-
urban plane tends to weaken the capacities and legiti-
macy of the democratic State; it ensues that the actual 
functioning of the mechanisms and procedures both of 
control (of the governed over the governors) and of pub-
lic decisions (of the governors for the governed) entails 
high salience of concentration of State powers.
De Tocqueville’s argument: autonomy of the municipal 
institutions and virtuous participation of free, equal 
citizens
In one of the most emblematic passages of Democracy 
in America, Alexis de Tocqueville (1838: 102) main-
tains, “The strength of free peoples resides in the town, 
however. Town institutions are to liberty what primary 
schools are to knowledge; they put it within the grasp of 
the people; they give them a taste of its peaceful practice 
and accustom them to its use. Without town institutions, 
a nation can pretend to have a free government, but it 
does not possess the spirit of liberty”.
De Toqueville’s statement encapsulates, very briefly, 
the crucial point of the argument on which high sali-
ence of the local-urban dimension is based for the the-
orists of the idealistic kind of democracy, and envisages 
the following logical steps. In the democratic models 
of the idealistic type, what counts is the judgement on 
good functioning of the democracy, in decisional terms. 
The judges are the citizens, considered free and equal 
in expressing their opinion. In order to judge in condi-
tions of freedom and equality, these same citizens need 
to know the reasons for the decisions as thoroughly as 
possible and to participate as inclusively as possible in 
their implementation. Knowledge and participation 
depend on the proximity of the decisional institutions; 
the city is the institutional place that is closest to the 
citizens; high salience of the local-urban dimension 
enhances the citizens’ capacity for judgement in condi-
tions of freedom and equality. It thus follows that good 
functioning of democracy (good democracy) entails high 
salience of the local-urban dimension.
Results and discussion: demonstration of thesis
To demonstrate the thesis supported here we will illus-
trate three theoretical models of democracy. We define as 
“theoretical model of democracy” a logical, well-argued 
construct able to represent the phenomenological class 
we have called “democracy”.
In the literature we can pick out three general theo-
retical models of democracy belonging to three different 
generations, linked in turn with three moments of trans-
formation of the limits and possibilities of democracy 
itself (Dahl 1989): the first generation theoretical model, 
which corresponds to classical democracy or that of the 
“ancients”; second generation theoretical model, equiva-
lent to modern liberal democracy; and third generation 
theoretical models that can be defined as two types, 
characterised respectively by a neo-realist approach cor-
responding to the quality democracy model, and by a 
neo-idealist approach which tends, on the other hand, 
towards the inclusive democracy model.
First generation theoretical model or classical democracy 
model: a high degree of idealism and high salience of the 
city
Why the classical democracy model is (essentially) a pure, 
idealistic model?
The first generation model, equivalent to classical 
democracy, shows a clear, predominant ideal vision. In 
the Greek idea of democracy both the actors of political 
activity and the actual activity they have to undertake are 
idealised, in order to create common good. As Dahl states 
(1989: 18) “[…] the citizen is a whole person for whom 
politics is a natural social activity not sharply separated 
from the rest of life, and for whom the government and 
the state—or rather, the polis—are not remote and alien 
distant from oneself. Rather, political life is only an exten-
sion of, and harmonious with, oneself. Values are not 
fragmented but coherent: for happiness is united with 
virtue, virtue with justice, and justice with happiness”.
The tie between city and democracy in the (prevalently) 
idealistic model of classical democracy
In this theoretical model the concept of democracy is 
strictly tied to the concept of city. In the past the city 
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was strongly linked with the ancient democratic regime. 
The Greek polis is perhaps the first example in West-
ern history of a territorial organisation where the strug-
gle for power and government activities coincided, both 
subjected to a power of self-determination given to the 
citizens (every adult male belonging to the demos of the 
polis). Consequently, the city may be understood as the 
cradle of the citizen, who, in turn, becomes the “nuclear” 
subject of the democratic government. For every citizen 
is summoned to discuss matters of common interest and 
all of them, in their turn, carry out government functions.
The Romans specified the bond between city and citi-
zens, when referring to the government of the res pub-
lica. The cives, inhabitants of a civium, were conceived 
as individuals sharing two features: firstly, the accom-
plishment of longstanding settlement in the urban space, 
contrary to the stranger (peregrinus) and the temporary 
inhabitant (incola or inquilinus); secondly, the status of 
citizen (belonging to the civitas) as a condition of free-
dom, with specific legal requirements protecting the 
individual from excessive political power and allowing 
him to participate, directly or indirectly, in the political 
choices of the community.
In the Greek idea of democracy and the Roman one 
of res publica the concepts of polity, politics and policy 
tend to converge in the idea itself of city: it is the city 
that simultaneously represents the place, purpose and 
practices through which the democratic regime can pro-
duce its best fruit (valid decisions for everyone) for the 
community.
This logical connection has been explained by Dahl 
(1989), according to whom the democratic order of 
ancient democracies had to possess, to be able to func-
tion and produce effects, certain fundamental requisites, 
all linked with maintaining the well-being of the city 
community. These requisites envisaged, first and fore-
most, that: (1) “Citizens must be sufficiently harmonious 
in their interests so that they can share, and act upon, 
a strong sense of a general good that is not in marked 
contradiction to their personal aims or interests”; (2) 
“[…] they must be highly homogeneous with respect to 
characteristics that otherwise tend to produce political 
conflict and sharp disagreement over the public good”; 
(3) “[…] the citizen body must be quite small”; (4) “[…] 
citizens must be able to assemble and directly decide on 
the laws and decisions of policy”; (5) “[…] citizens must 
participate actively in the administration of the city”; (6) 
“[…] the city-state must […] remain fully autonomous” 
(Dahl 1989: 18–19).
According to Dahl, this is the first great hiatus that 
marks the arrival of democracy. As can been understood 
from his words, it is a historic moment at which there 
is an alignment of a series of conditions, all linked with 
keeping a precise spatial configuration, the polis, which 
keeps the community together, motivates collective gov-
ernment action in terms of equality and disciplines the 
rules of collective decision.
We may therefore state that in the classical concep-
tion the territorial configuration of the polis is a neces-
sary condition, even if not sufficient, for the creation of a 
democracy. The democracy of the ancients was city-cen-
tred and, necessarily, polity-centred.
The Greek polis and the Roman res publica gave shape 
and concrete substance to the Aristotelian definition 
of perfect freedom of the citizen of the ancient world, 
who was neither sovereign nor subject, but on differ-
ent occasions “governor” and “governed”, and capable, 
therefore both of commanding and obeying. Within the 
urban dimension of the polis a decisive step was taken at 
the same time towards creating effective homogeneous-
ness of equality between citizens, guaranteed by access 
to offices by drawing lots, and by direct participation in 
decisions. It was in the city, and within its borders only, 
that the objective of self-government could be achieved, 
therefore, which was considered the authentic corner-
stone of classical democracy.
From what has been said, it follows that the democracy 
of the ancients envisaged a single theoretical model, ide-
alised and logically coherent in its components of polity, 
politics and policy. As Dahl explained (1982, 1989), for 
the Greeks it was obvious that if democracy were desir-
able, it would have to exist in a city-state, since a good 
State could only exist in a city.
On the other hand, if we were to interpret classical the-
ory only in realistic terms, it would lose a large number 
of its requisites of democraticity, revealing conditions of 
government of the community of a basically authoritar-
ian type. Seen with realistic eyes, then, Greek democracy 
would emerge as a regime unable to satisfy the requi-
sites of inclusivity and freedom of public protest valid to 
establish the minimum threshold of democraticity of a 
regime. Greek polis government, seen from this perspec-
tive, would be a particular case of oligarchic despotism 
(self-government of a minority) exercised over a majority 
of individuals devoid of any capacity for self-determina-
tion. From this stems the fact that the relation between 
democracy and salience of the city, if introduced into a 
theoretical context of a realistic type, would lose its sense, 
since the first term of the relation itself would be lost.
Second generation or liberal democratic theoretical model: 
a high degree of realism and low salience of the city
Why the liberal democratic model is (basically) a pure, 
realistic model?
Schumpeter defines democracy, in a procedural sense, as 
a method to decide on collective problems. It is, however, 
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a method that—to operate effectively—must be subjected 
to strict regulatory requirements and functional rules that 
make the delegation of power from the many to the few 
tolerable and socially acceptable, according to a formal 
mandate of representation. In order to exercise their deci-
sion-making powers, the representatives must therefore 
be institutionalised winners of a competition that selects 
the competitors, translating the vote of those represented 
into seats in parliament and/or government offices.
These are, in a nutshell, the empirical and functional 
attributes of the Schumpeterian definition: (1) democ-
racy aims to produce decisions. If it is not able to gener-
ate decisions, it is not a method of government suitable 
for the organised community; (2) decisions are made by 
a minority: the representatives. Without elites, the demo-
cratic method is ineffective, if compared to its decision-
making purposes; (3) the selection of the representatives 
must be the result of a competition; if there is no effective 
competition among political leaders, democracy decays; 
(4) the selection mechanism is the popular vote based on 
majority rule; we cannot speak of democracy if leader-
ship emerges from other selection criteria; (5) the legiti-
macy of the procedure derives from compliance with the 
attributes 1, 2, 3, 4, each of which is intended as a neces-
sary condition, and all together as a sufficient condition 
of effective democracy.
According to Schumpeter, the voter’s opinion in a regu-
lated competition between elites (contestability) deter-
mines who holds the decision-making powers.
Democratic regimes may therefore be differentiated 
depending on the complex set of requirements involving 
how the competition is institutionalised and procedural-
ised. The outcomes of democracies, namely the capacity 
to produce decisions, depend on the kind of institutions 
and procedures that encapsulate the struggle for power 
between competing elites. It is clear that, in order to 
work in practice, the democratic method has to manage 
a system of legal regulation of procedures on which it is 
based: a structure of rules and roles of authority capable 
of embodying and ensuring both the rights of freedom 
and equality for all citizens, and the action of efficient, 
competent bureaucracies in the processes of law enforce-
ment (Schumpeter 1942).
Schumpeter’s model therefore summarises the most 
important grounds on which contemporary realistic the-
ories of democracy are based. Given the incompatibility 
of the interests and values at stake, Hobbes’ type of rea-
soning is valid (Przeworski 1988; Hardin 2003), accord-
ing to which democracy is justified since it represents a 
humane decisional method at a collective level, which 
endures and is sustained as long as none of the groups 
comprising the society finds it more convenient to trigger 
a social conflict rather than keep to the rules of the game.
“Pluralist” models also took inspiration from this idea, 
placing among the essential conditions of good function-
ing of democracy the existence of fragmented, “overlap-
ping majorities”, guaranteeing an adequate replacement 
of power and the fact that no faction systematically find 
itself at a disadvantage (Dahl 1961, 1978).
If it is true that the peaceful management of political 
conflict constitutes a problem for every political order, 
it is just as true that for representative democracy in its 
State configuration, this issue takes on absolute priority. 
The reason is explained with great skill by Stein Rokkan 
(1970) and may be summarised as follows: with weak-
ening cultural uniformity and the limited dimensions of 
the demos characterising the democracy of the Greek 
polis and the Roman res publica, the problem is posed 
of developing efficient institutions fit to solve by peace-
ful, constitutional means the political disputes that tend 
to arise along multiple lines of conflict in the territorial 
sphere of the nation-States.
The tie between State and democracy in the (prevalently) 
realistic model of liberal democracy
Dahl (1982), when reconstructing the evolutionary 
pathway of democracy, singled out a second temporal 
break, which could be placed roughly between the 19th 
and 20th centuries. This point of discontinuity marked 
the birth of the modern liberal democracies, within the 
sphere of a different territorial context, that of national 
States. These are the consequences of the increase in 
scale in moving from the city-state to the nation-state: 
(1) representation has displaced direct participation; (2) 
no theoretical upper limit on the size of the demos; (3) 
participatory democracy has become even more limited; 
(4) greater diversity of people in ways relevant to politi-
cal life; (5) political cleavages are multiplied and political 
conflict is inevitable; (6) development of polyarchy as a 
set of institutions; (7) social and organizational plural-
ism; and (8) expansion of individual rights in polyarchies 
(Dahl 1989: 219).
In contemporary democracies, all these devices occur 
to develop a new concept of citizenship, where the guar-
antees of freedom (a mix of civil, political and social 
rights) are extended (for blood rights or soil rights) to all 
subjects having common cultural characteristics within 
the boundaries of national States. Citizens, rather than 
city dwellers, are the individual units of democratic 
States, to whom all democratic rights and freedom are 
fully granted.
In modern liberal democracy, therefore, the citizen 
loses his original juridical bond with the city to consoli-
date that with the State.
If it is true that the citizen is such because he belongs 
to a community extended to the whole of the territory 
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of the State, territorial unity of the State no longer guar-
antees, as happened for the city-State, the possibility 
of equal access to offices at the level of politics, or self-
government at the level of policy. The competition for 
power arises above all at a national level (even though the 
popular vote is granted at local electoral districts) and is 
organised by intermediate structures (political parties) 
that establish the link between representatives and the 
represented. Government decisions are taken by repre-
sentatives, while those represented, at a local level, are 
confined to exercising a power of selection between com-
petitive minorities.
The model that has spread through the community of 
realistic democracy scholars is that of competitive elit-
ism in a unitary democratic State. It comes down directly 
from State and nation-building models developed by the 
socio-political sciences, adapted to the different distribu-
tion of power democracy imposes if compared with mon-
ist or oligarchic regimes.
The unitary democratic State model envisages the 
presence of two fundamental conditions to create a 
functioning democracy. Max Weber described both con-
ditions extensively in his writing on the strengths and 
weaknesses of representative democracy in the modern 
nation-States (Weber 1922). He argued that the model 
of competitive elites (called “democracy with plebiscitary 
leadership”) depends essentially on how the State is able 
to guarantee a certain degree of rule of law and a certain 
level of bureaucratic organisation.
Weber, like Schumpeter, states that competition and 
participation are the engines of democratic functioning. 
He emphasises that both dimensions risk being ineffec-
tive if not supported by thorough institutionalisation of 
an articulate system of rules and roles capable of defend-
ing the public and private rights of citizens, together with 
the legitimate interests of governments. The fundamental 
quality of democratic regimes—the capacity given to all 
citizens to play a role in the selection of ruling elites and 
to legitimise those chosen by free electoral competition—
depends on the effectiveness of the rule of law.
However, a high degree of rule of law is not sufficient 
on its own to ensure the proper functioning of democ-
racy, if not bound to a certain development of bureau-
cratic organisation. Bureaucracy, according to Weber, 
is essential to rationalise the effects of the extension of 
citizenship to the masses, rather than solve coordination 
problems created by the development of markets. Mass 
citizenship in fact determines qualitative and quantitative 
growth of the input aimed at the State. Those who get the 
right to vote require not only greater State intervention 
in many policy areas, but also equal treatment of people 
with similar needs, that is, fulfilment regardless of indi-
viduals, based on calculable rules.
Therefore, specialised, predictable public administra-
tion is a necessary condition to achieve the important 
aims of democracy. Weber quotes, in this respect, the 
end of arbitrariness, unpredictability and excessive politi-
cal patronage in the regulation of public affairs; the avail-
ability of publicly known procedures to treat or decide 
upon collective problems; the establishment of rules that 
allow citizens to verify the legitimacy of decisions and 
decision-making.
As a consequence, the complexity of democratic struc-
tures, procedures and processes tends to make highly 
centralised political organisation of the State inevitable. 
Only with centralised, monocratic bureaucracy will accu-
racy, speed, uniqueness, the publication of decisions, 
continuity, discretion, cohesion, strict subordination, a 
reduction of contrasts, objective and personal expenses 
achieve their best (Weber 1922).
Weber assumed that in democracies bureaucratic 
development tends to take place, as in non-democratic 
regimes, following an identical model: the centralised 
bureaucratic model.
The definitions mentioned above have a clear top-
down imprint; in fact, this approach was characterised 
by a view that reduced the scope of political activity to a 
minimum in the implementation phase. Better expressed, 
the model was based on a conception of administration 
as an executive machine and “closed system”, impervious 
to social dynamics; it led to conceptualising the imple-
mentation of public policy in terms of enforcement: it 
concerned levels of bureaucratic compliance to govern-
mental decisions and degrees of control carried out by 
political decision-makers on administrative processes, 
organisation and technology.
Since State-building started in the modern age, the 
autonomy and self-government of cities has been consid-
ered illegitimate by emerging nation-States. Contempo-
rary democratic States continue to monopolise the legal 
system and drastically limit the decision-making auton-
omy of cities: any claim to autonomy and independence 
not resulting from the power of the central government 
was illegitimate and illegal. The vertical model of centre-
periphery relations thus developed.
From what has been said it follows that liberal democ-
racy also envisages a single logically coherent model, but 
based, in contrast with the classical model, on the graft-
ing of competitive elitism, representation and a unitary 
national State, with strong centralised control.
Unitary State and role of political and administrative 
decentralisation
In the realistic model of democracy the vertical articula-
tion of the unitary model along the axis of centre-periph-
ery relations takes on the features of decentralisation. 
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Decentralisation can be defined as a “process with a top-
down, reversible nature”,4 thanks to the fact that it can be 
revoked by that same centre that decided upon it and 
transferred it to the periphery (Baldi 2003: 6).
The unitary State has experimented during the course 
of its history with different forms of decentralisation, not 
always defined unambiguously in the literature (Mény 
1990; Sharpe 1993; Baldi 2003). If we wished to find a 
minimal common denominator, we could maintain that 
political decentralisation, as a sort of decentralisation 
category became established in the post liberal phase of 
the State, evolving out of administrative decentralisa-
tion, which originated during the Jacobin State phase in 
France and characterised the Napoleonic period.
The margins of discretion and the autonomous politi-
cal-management forms entrusted to local governments as 
a consequence of the past evolution of the various demo-
cratic countries have reduced the features of centralisa-
tion, hierarchy and uniformity of the State, while the 
principle of centralism characterising the unitary model 
has remained unchanged. Although, in effect, planning, 
steering and coordination instruments, and finally those 
of financing and evaluation, assigned to peripheries dur-
ing the course of the various policy-making phases, may 
manage to depict territorial boards as authentic centres 
of political decision, it will always be the central govern-
ment that will decide upon the degree and contents of 
decentralisation. For political decentralisation is a top-
down process, in which the centre possesses exclusive 
use in every phase of legislative and regulatory power.
Third generation theoretical models
Neo‑realistic or “quality democracy” models
In recent decades many political scientists have reacted 
to the realistic approach to the theory of democracy, 
achieving balanced theories of a hybrid nature, i.e. the-
ories that do not intend, on the one hand, to lose their 
descriptive-empirical overtones on a realist framework 
but, on the other, face the problem of how to enhance 
the functionality, capacities and legitimisation of the 
democratic State. And in so doing, call forth the differ-
ent values that support it. For the authors that adhere to 
this school of thought it is therefore a case of harmonis-
ing both the empirical and normative aspects of democ-
racy within a single theoretical perspective (Tebaldi and 
Calaresu 2009, 2016).
The common reflection from which these authors 
depart concerns the need to evaluate more thoroughly 
the state of health of today’s mass liberal democracies, 
with the purpose of strengthening their foundations 
and improving their performance. Following the wave of 
4 Our translation.
participation of the 1970s and the associated dangers of 
decisional overload, nowadays democracies have to cope 
with an almost generalised fall in the rates of participa-
tion, both at politico-administrative elections (Gray and 
Caul 2000) and in all other forms of civic involvement 
(Putnam 2000; Pharr and Putnam 2000), and with the 
constant fall in levels of faith in the institutions (New-
ton and Norris 2000) and disaffection for politics of ever 
larger cohorts of citizens (Welzel and Inglehart 2005). 
To this is added, and closely connected, the problem of 
enhancing the political yield of democracies in coping 
with the overlapping of cultural, social and economic 
crises that weaken the capacities of the public decision-
makers to respond to citizens’ questions.
As Sartori and Arend Lijphart ask themselves, what, 
then, is the task of democratic ideals in democracy, see-
ing as real democracies will never be able to perfectly 
respond to the ideals that generate them? The answer is 
simple and concise, and acts as a background to all politi-
cal studies that have dealt with the problem: the ideal, 
says Sartori (1993: 54) “remains a parameter that is 
expected to measure and press the real forward ‘towards 
the best’”.5 Namely, according to Lijphart (1984: 2): “[…] 
the end of a scale on which the degree of democratic 
responsiveness of different regimes may be measured”.
And what is the role of political science, we might add, 
in pursuing the ideals spoken of, without however run-
ning into the ideological fallacy of “evaluative science”? A 
research plan needs to be set up as follows: as an intro-
duction and a priority, the values need to be stated upon 
which the entire theoretical construct is based, clarifying 
their semantic specificity and the relations (of exclusion, 
agreement, reciprocal reinforcement and non-interfer-
ence) that bind them to each other and/or to other goods 
of democracy; on a theoretical plane, the conditions need 
to be established that make probable or, on the contrary, 
inhibit the probability that a democratic system may 
transform the values that have inspired it into concrete 
results; it is necessary to test, at a factual-empirical level, 
whether and to what extent, causal relations adhere to 
the conditions proposed and generate results in line with 
value expectations.
These three steps reflect to a large extent the proce-
dural points of Lasswell’s pattern (1963) to introduce a 
“policy science” able to enhance the results of democracy. 
To this end, he quotes: the clarification of aims, which 
includes both justification of the values and translation of 
the abstract principles into operational terms; the sketch-
ing out of trends of the past and present as regards imple-
mentation of the values selected; the (strictly scientific) 
analysis of the factors conditioning the implementation 
5 Our translation.
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of values; presentation of the probable or possible future, 
based on hypothetical constructs of development; and 
the evaluation of alternative options the decision-makers 
are faced with.
Theoretical models of democratic quality, though 
acknowledging that decentralisation and local autonomy 
are phenomena that affect the organisational and institu-
tional structure of all contemporary democracies, do not 
set out from the assumption that these are values in 
themselves, i.e. components of democratic quality, but 
share the hypothesis that they are among the explanatory 
factors of the levels of democratic quality. How and why 
this influence is exerted is an issue to be considered a 
problem requiring an empirical survey. Problematisation 
is summarised well, on a theoretical plane, by Alfred 
Stepan (1998).6 He states that “if it is accepted that ‘free-
dom’, ‘equality’ and ‘efficacy’ are all important for quality 
democracy, then we need to ask ourselves how these 
three principles are linked with each other in a federal 
democratic system” (Stepan 1998: 15).7 For, given that “a 
strong current of American liberal thought emphasises 
the contribution of federalism to freedom” and to the 
“tyranny of the majority”, the author wonders whether 
the instruments of federalism that guarantee this free-
dom (e.g. the request for legislative super-majorities or 
the power of veto) might not end up reducing equality 
(expressed by the principle “one man, one vote”) and the 
decisional efficacy of government institutions. In other 
words, if decentralisation can be seen as a factor of free-
dom, we must previously single out to which freedom we 
are referring, since the freedom of local communities 
may enter into conflict with the freedom of the individ-
ual, just as there may be tension between rights defined 
on a geographic plane and rights founded on universalist 
principles, like equality, responsiveness and accountabil-
ity (Mény and Wright 1985).
Similarly, “decentralisation transfers some power closer 
to citizens and is therefore a thoroughly democratic 
choice; but precisely this closeness may produce […] 
patronage and corruption phenomena and may foster the 
rise of oligarchic social groups able to endure” (Bobbio 
2002: 51).8
On the basis of the research carried out, the hypoth-
esis that local power may or may not constitute a factor 
of development for the quality of democracies has, up to 
now, obtained responses that do not seem to resolve the 
matter and appear to lean towards a bland, if not neutral, 
effect on democratic quality.
6 Stepan (1998) refers to decentralisation only in terms of federalism, but 
with arguments that can well be applied to any form of decentralisation.
7 Our translation.
8 Our translation.
One of the more successful attempts to assess the qual-
ity of democracies was carried out by Lijphart (1999). As 
is well known, the distinction between majority democ-
racies and consensus democracies developed by the 
Dutch scholar was based on two dimensions: the exec-
utives-parties dimension and the federal-unitary dimen-
sion. The latter dimension, inherent in relations between 
centre and periphery, envisages: for the majority model, a 
unitary State system with a flexible, amendable constitu-
tion, capable of promoting a hierarchical influence of the 
national majority over single local majorities, while, for 
the consensus model, a federal, and/or highly decentral-
ised, State system with a rigid constitution able to guar-
antee—since it is organised territorially or functionally in 
politico-administrative autonomies—representation of 
the single minorities with centre-binding mechanisms. In 
the case of the majority model, jurisdictional control will 
be by parliamentary sovereignty, whereas for the consen-
sus model it will pass through a constitutional court of a 
federal nature. The central bank, for the majority model, 
will however be dependent on the executive, while in the 
case of the consensus model, it will be independent from 
its control.
At a democratic quality level, the empirical analy-
sis conducted by Lijphart led him to state that “[…] the 
correlations are so weak that they do not allow any sub-
stantive conclusions in favor of one or the other type of 
democracy” (Lijphart 1999: 272); this is if the positive cor-
relation is excluded between consensus democracy and 
greater efficacy of the struggle against inflation, due to 
the independence of the central banks from government 
majorities. On the contrary “[…] consensus democracy 
makes a difference. Indeed, consensus democracy—on 
the executives-parties dimension—makes a big difference 
with regard to almost all of the indicators of democratic 
quality” (Lijphart 1999: 300).
A model of democratic quality analysis that is just as 
important is that developed by Leonardo Morlino. The 
author (Morlino 2003; Diamond and Morlino 2005) con-
siders as “good democracy” and therefore “quality democ-
racy”, first and foremost that system of government that 
fulfils citizens’ expectations as regards services for public 
decisions (quality in terms of results); secondly, regimes 
in which citizens, associations and communities enjoy 
full political equality and freedom (quality in terms of 
content); almost as a consequence, a legitimised democ-
racy will see these same citizens enjoy the power of sanc-
tion and assessment as concerns the way and degree to 
which the government provides them with freedom and 
equality, in agreement with rule of law criteria. Last but 
not least, quality democracy requires citizens, organisa-
tions and political parties to participate and compete to 
obtain elective offices which entrust them, not only with 
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the power to hold office and take decisions, but also the 
responsibility of doing so. It should therefore be the citi-
zens themselves who guarantee high levels of democratic 
quality, monitoring the efficiency and impartiality of law 
enforcement, efficacy of government decisions, political 
responsibility and the continuous responsiveness of the 
elected to their needs and requirements (quality in terms 
of procedure).
Beginning with the hypothesis that decentralisation can 
affect in a contradictory manner the dimensions of demo-
cratic quality, like equality, freedom, rule of law, respon-
siveness and accountability, the empirical research 
conducted on the case of Italy (Morlino et al. 2013) aimed 
to ascertain, in particular, the degree and type of influence 
the decentralising process exerted on inter-institutional 
accountability mechanisms over the span of 20 years. The 
results of the research, conducted with qualitative and 
quantitative techniques at regional government level, 
show that the devolution of power from centre to periph-
ery, if carried out in an uncertain, incomplete way, as in 
the case of Italy, weakens the processes of accountability, 
rather than enhancing them: “the lack of implementation 
of reforms and the inefficacy of controls at a sub-national 
level make accountability channels weak and relations 
between centre and periphery not very transparent, in a 
general situation that prefigures regionalism with variable 
geometry, potentially damaging for the extension and fru-
ition of equal rights” (Galanti 2013: 176).9
Neo‑idealist or inclusive democracy models
For the exponents of neo-idealist models the reasons for 
dissatisfaction with the pure realistic model are basically 
two. The first is that it ends up validating and legitimising 
the present situation, characterised by poor quality of life, 
loss of citizens’ interest in politics and by the prevarica-
tion of lobbies and economic interests. The second criti-
cism is that realistic liberal democracy theories are not 
able, in so far as they take away from democracy any ref-
erence to values, to explain the motivation citizens might 
have to participate in the democratic game. Democracy, 
in order to function, cannot be understood by the partici-
pants as a game far from their interests, tending toward 
the unknown and not easily influenced in its outcomes, 
or as a mere, more humane substitute for civil war. This 
means that, in spite of their claims to “realism”, these 
models are in no way able to explain how democracies 
function.
The “right” reaction to confront the problems of the 
existing democracies, according to these critics, does 
not consist of limiting ourselves to explaining the way 
they function, whether good or bad, and accepting 
9 Our translation.
their weaknesses in the name of alleged “realism”, but of 
renewing the reflection on their normative prerequisites 
and in the light of these proposing institutional reforms, 
new participatory practices and greater control of undue 
misrepresentation or interference on the part of occult 
and/or oligarchic powers.
1. The participatory model and the centrality of the local 
dimension.
The main “gauntlet” against the representative model is 
thrown by the “model of participatory democracy” (Held 
2006). Since halfway through the 1960s the social move-
ments active at an urban level have asserted, using the 
protest as a political resource (Lipsky 1965), the legiti-
macy of alternative forms of democracy to the represent-
ative one, developing a new conception of “bottom-up” 
democracy (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1994; Gould et al. 1996). 
In the words of Herbert Kitschelt (1993: 15): “the stakes 
and struggles of the left and libertarian social movements 
[…] invoke an ancient element of democratic theory that 
calls for an organisation of collective decision making 
referred to in varying ways as classical, populist, commu-
nitarian, strong, grass-roots, or direct democracy against 
a democratic practice in contemporary democracies 
labelled as realist, liberal, elite, republican, or representa-
tive democracy”.
The justification principle of the representative model 
lies in the fact that, beyond the supremacy of the law, high 
levels of freedom can only be achieved in a “participatory 
society” that will encourage a sense of political efficacy, 
nurture interest in collective problems and contribute to 
the education of well-informed citizens, capable of hav-
ing sustained interest in the government process and 
influence over final decisions (Pateman 1970).
Fundamental diverse features stem from these differ-
ent justification principles between the two models: if 
the representative model envisages that the citizen elect 
his representatives and exercise his control by means 
of the threat of non re-election at subsequent elections, 
participatory democracy opposes the principle of del-
egation, which is seen as an instrument of oligarchic 
power. In the participatory model representatives must, 
in effect, always be revocable; not being in possession of 
a generalised delegation, each time a decision is faced 
(and not just at the moment of voting), the citizen must 
be given the chance to actively take part in that decision 
(Macpherson 1966, 1973, 1977). For there to be “partici-
pation”, citizens must, then, be involved in the regulation 
of the institutions and in the key decisions of society. For 
this reason, participatory democracy legitimises all those 
non-institutional forms of pressure on decisions that may 
be defined as “protest repertories”.
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From this point of view, the local dimension is particu-
larly important to stimulate the participation and direct 
commitment of citizens. One of the main assumptions of 
the participatory model is, in fact, that the vote expressed 
by the citizen in the place where he spends his everyday 
life is better than the vote expressed at a national level 
(Held and Pollit 1986). Participatory practice at a local 
level is seen as a “school” that teaches the citizen to assess 
the work of the representatives at a national level. The 
institutional system that begins to take shape therefore 
is “open” and strengthens, in terms of democratic choice, 
on the one hand, the local autonomies and power with 
respect to the centre and, on the other, the citizens with 
respect to the State. For the followers of the participatory 
model, in this way real improvement in the conditions of 
many social groups is also possible, through the redistri-
bution of material resources and the reduction to a mini-
mum (or if possible complete elimination) of bureaucratic 
power, not democratically responsible, both in public and 
private life. Hence the participatory model challenges the 
justifications, characteristics and conditions of the repre-
sentative model, introducing the principle of participative 
strength (and need) of local boards and citizens.
2. The deliberative model and face-to-face interactions.
Schumpeter’s model of democracy and the centrality of 
the concept of representation are “challenged” further by 
the followers of deliberative democracy. The theoretical 
papers that can be attributed to this approach (Bohman 
and Rehg 1997; Elster 1998; Fishkin and Laslett 2003; Par-
kinson and Mansbridge 2012) maintain that deliberative 
techniques and structures are potentially able to improve 
decisional outcomes and raise the responsiveness of the 
democratic system to the level of subjects who do not 
have the vote (Habermas 1992; Mansbridge 1999; Dry-
zek 2000). Deliberative democracy, without intending to 
totally challenge, on the one hand, “[the] aggregation as a 
decision rule” (Chambers 2012: 52), and without neces-
sarily intending, on the other, to replace the existing insti-
tutions of democracy (Steiner et al. 2004), tries to compete 
with representative models, seeking solutions that guar-
antee higher levels of legitimacy to the said regime.
To be specific, the deliberative model aims—with an 
emphasis both descriptive and prescriptive—to put the 
citizen at the centre of the public discussion, involving 
him/her directly in the collective decision-making pro-
cess, with the purpose of enhancing the legitimacy of this 
process and its outcomes.10
10 As maintained by Nicole Curato, by transposing the deliberative ideal 
into concrete practices, it would be possible for political decision-making 
to be governed by “norms of openness, public spiritedness and inclusivity 
instead of staunch partisanship or political horse-trading” (2015: 103).
The variety of deliberative experiments carried out 
over recent decades are so numerous and different from 
each other (Gastil and Levine 2005) that some scholars 
have reached the point of stating “[…] it is impossible to 
acquire a thorough knowledge of participatory experi-
ments, especially as most of them take place at the local 
(small-scale, ‘micro’) level, and are not widely publicized” 
(Papadopoulos 2012: 125).
What these experiments appear to have in common, 
apart from their specific nature and the difficulty in clas-
sifying them, is first of all “the fact of distinguishing 
themselves from the traditional forms of participation, 
centred on the institutes of participatory democracy, and 
on a distinction between public institutions and citizens 
who are listened to” (Morlino and Gelli 2008: 20).11 With 
respect to the participatory model we have already exam-
ined, deliberative model theorists again propose to abol-
ish the “incompetent participation” of citizens and “the 
old utopia of mass participation” through conscious 
activities of reflection, debate and consideration of issues 
of public interest.12 As maintained by Daniela Giannetti 
(2007: 125), deliberative democracy places itself, in short, 
as a “new paradigm of democratic participation”.13
Secondly, we may note how all the deliberative experi-
ments aim for full equality of participation, not con-
ditioned by specific criteria or citizen competence 
requisites. The deliberative arenas “only” need to be 
highly inclusive (we might say, to a maximum), precisely 
because, as stated, they aim to have all those participate, 
in equal conditions, upon whom the consequences of 
the decisions will fall. In other words, deliberative theo-
rists hypothesise that the “outcomes are legitimate to the 
extent they receive reflective assent through participation 
in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the deci-
sion in question” (Dryzek 2001: 651).
It follows, from a logical point of view, that the delibera-
tive democratic ideal is prevalently feasible in small-scale 
societies, thanks to the direct, non-mediated encounter 
between “sub-groups of citizens” (“self-selected” or “ran-
domly selected”), “stakeholder participants” (Bohman 
2012), “small critical communities” (Giannetti 2007), or 
“mini-public groups” (Fung 2003), where “face-to-face 
interactions” are the norm (Laslett 1956; Dahl 1970; Dahl 
and Tufte 1973; Mansbridge 1980); however, “in large-
scale mass societies, they are not and cannot be” (Goodin 
2003: 54).
11 Our translation.
12 According to Jeremy Fishkin (2004: 34), the quality and efficacy of delib-
eration depend on the complete fulfilment of four crucial factors: (1) the 
completeness of the arguments; (2) the accuracy of information on the 
theme dealt with; (3) awareness and correctness of the people involved in 
the debate; (4) pluralism of the positions presented.
13 Our translation.
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The high salience of a small-scale dimension with the 
purpose of full achievement of the deliberative ideal is 
also confirmed by the complications arising from the 
“distinctive perspectives associated with distant oth-
ers who must be represented in any genuinely demo-
cratic deliberation across an extended polity” (Goodin 
2003: 55). For however ideally it is constructed, no single 
deliberative experiment could possess on a large scale a 
deliberative capacity adequate “to legitimate most of the 
decisions and policies that democracies adopt” (Mans-
bridge et al. 2012: 1).
As further proof of this reasoning, it is possible to high-
light with a “contrary” argument that the main challenge 
for deliberative democracy theorists is still actually now-
adays that of finding the way to adapt their ideals to a 
larger scale,14 where organising “face-to-face” discussions 
that will involve non-mediated interactions of extended 
communities is considered extremely complicated, if not 
impossible (Minow 1990; Mouffe 1992; Goodin 2003). 
Almost all the empirical research on the argument has 
been concentrated, consequently “either on a single epi-
sode of deliberation, as in one-time group discussions, or 
on a continuing series with the same group or in the same 
type of institution” (Thompson 2008: 213).
Deliberative theorists committed to the challenge 
themselves admit that theoretical solutions able to 
release the deliberative model (and its applications) 
from a “micro” (localised and local) scale, linking it up 
more (though not univocally) to a “macro” (generalised 
and global) dimension, are not easy to find. The main 
attempts at the moment have usually addressed three 
research approaches: (1) the first focuses on the planning 
and institutionalisation of deliberative practices and are-
nas that will be able to legitimise the decisional process, 
with a function of substitution/integration of the tradi-
tional institutions of large-scale political representation 
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Fishkin 1997; Goodin 
and Dryzek 2006); (2) the second approach focuses on 
the “central” and “mass” institutions already existing in 
the different liberal democracies, and on all political par-
ties, electoral laws and legislative bodies, without claim-
ing to want to substitute or integrate them but seeking 
instead to analyse and improve their deliberative nature 
and that of the “procedures” by which their members are 
elected (Bessette 1994; Steiner et al. 2004); (3) the third 
and last approach, which tries to bring together the pre-
vious research lines, integrating them, is working on the 
attempt to configure deliberative democracy in “sys-
temic” terms. The approach in question acknowledges 
14 Not only with reference to the global scale or national polity, but also 
roughly to the regional scale, or simply to a wider citizen context like a 
small/medium-sized municipality or larger groups of citizens than those of 
a “mini-public”.
democracies as complex entities, in which a variety of 
institutions, associations and places of non-deliberative 
political representation co-exist, including informal net-
works, mass media, interest groups, schools, private 
foundations and non-profit institutions, legislative bod-
ies, executive agencies and courts of justice. In other 
words, the attempt aims at defining a wider theoretical 
framework able to increase understanding of the inter-
relations between institutions, associations and places of 
political representation (Habermas 1992; Dryzek 2000; 
Parkinson 2006), with the ultimate objective of maxim-
ising the deliberative paradigm within many decisional 
spheres of democracy (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012).
Conclusions: bringing the city back in? A 
challenging question
To justify the supremacy of urban polity as the best terri-
torial unit for democratic development is, for democratic 
theory, an issue that takes on great importance in first 
generation idealistic theories but little in realistic second 
generation ones. If, for the former, the city is the favoured 
place to enable direct citizen control over government 
decisions, and in this way synchronically achieve the 
dual ideals of good citizen and good government, for the 
latter, it represents a dangerous, distorting factor of the 
control decision-makers have to exercise over State appa-
ratuses in order to govern with full effectiveness, efficacy 
and legitimacy.
In third generation theories, which reject the pure 
dualism between realistic description of power and nor-
mative justification of principles, seeking an alternative 
route in hybrid models, the question of the role of local 
powers in democratic theory takes on a different outline. 
For the neo-realist or quality democracy theories, the 
degree of decentralisation of the political system is not 
a value in itself, but a factor that can take on a neutral 
value or can affect, in a positive or negative sense, good 
democratic government, depending on its overall coher-
ence with the political project it is part of (e.g. a majority 
or consensus democracy) and its degree of institutionali-
sation. For the neo-idealist or inclusive democracy theo-
ries, the enhancement of local autonomy—though within 
State systems and consolidated representative pro-
cesses—is one of the necessary conditions for good dem-
ocratic government. It is mainly at a local-urban level 
that both the mechanisms of public discussion able to 
improve the transmission of information and selection of 
the best arguments, and the spaces and arenas that pro-
duce full, effective and influential participation of indi-
viduals and fairer, more pondered final decisions, can be 
implemented. The basic justification of local democratic 
institutions, according to these models, is that they insti-
tutionalise a fundamental normative principle common 
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to all discursive, participated interactions, which makes a 
search necessary for wider, more shared consensus com-
pared with that deriving from the application of majority 
rule by elected representatives.
Both third generation theoretical models, as can be 
deduced from our analysis, seek good democratic gov-
ernment. They do it, however, from two different per-
spectives, upon which the type and degree of importance 
they give to the local power dimension depends.
Quality democracy models start out, with a certain 
degree of realism, from the structure of the regime and 
the competitive processes of representation (democratic 
politics) to understand how to move closer, as much as 
possible, to the ideal achievement of “quality democracy”, 
in terms of fundamental democratic goods or values. For 
this reason, in quality democracy theories, the role of the 
city is a matter with a theoretical nature that underpins 
different solutions (there may be good democratic qual-
ity in the presence of strong local autonomy, but also the 
opposite). It follows that the supremacy of the city, seen 
from this angle, is not a value in itself, and its pursuit may 
give variable results: good, if it is placed in an institutional 
project coherent with the problems and lines of conflict 
present in the society; irrelevant or, at worst, damaging, 
if this coherence does not arise. According to inclusive 
democracy models, on the other hand, good democracy 
is a direct product of the participatory and deliberative 
methods by which policy-making processes are carried 
out, methods that in fact produce favourable conse-
quences on good democratic government, regardless of 
the competitive logics of politics. Given that maximum 
inclusivity, participated and deliberative, is achieved at 
a local-urban level (or at least within a “micro” scale), 
we can speak of the rising of “democra-city” for the 21st 
century: 50 years after the words of Robert Dahl (Dahl 
1967: 964), the city thus becomes, more and better than 
any other institutional place, the ultimate arena within 
which the best results may be achieved for democracy. In 
a “democra-city” perspective, the city really becomes the 
optimum unity for democracy, and a real superiority, into 
democratic theory, is therefore restored to the city com-
pared with the other territorial institutions of democracy.
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